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ESSAY
STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE DISPOSAL OF
HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Until the late 1960's, the federal government and the nuclear in-
dustry believed that the technology needed for the safe storage of nu-
clear waste would be developed.' Such technological breakthroughs
have yet to occur. Not being discouraged, the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (AEC) announced in 1970 that it would construct a federal waste
repository in an abandoned salt mine near Lyons, Kansas.2 Unfortu-
nately, the project was abandoned when geological evidence revealed
technological problems with the site? The failure of the Kansas reposi-
tory, coupled with the discovery in 1973 that 115,000 gallons of highly
radioactive liquid waste leaked out of storage tanks at Hanford, Wash-
ington,4 caused many people to question the federal government's abil-
ity to deal with the waste problem.5
Nevertheless, the federal government and the nuclear industry re-
mained steadfast in their belief that a method of reprocessing spent fuel
* Winning essay of the Eighth Annual National Energy Law and Policy Institute Essay
Competition.
1. H.R. REP. No. 491, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 27, revirinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3792, 3793.
2. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, NUCLEAR ENERGY'S DILEMMA: Dis-
POSING OF HAzARDouS RADIOACTIVE WASTE SAFELY 8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROL-
LER GENERAL].
3. Oversight Hearings on Nuclear Waste Management Before the Subcommittee on Energy
and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
72 (1977) (statement by Dr. Terry Lash) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings]. There were aban-
doned and uncapped oil and gas exploration wells in the vicinity of the salt bed. Those wells
probably could not have been capped in such a way as to insure that water would not follow the
wells down and intrude into the salt bed, creating the possibility of radioactivity leakage. Id
4. In 1973 a sustained leak totalling 115,000 gallons went undetected for fifty-five days, even
though levels in the tanks were being recorded daily; no one compared each day's readings with
the reading of the day before. Polsgrove, Where Will We Dump the Nuclear Trash? Not in My
Backyard, THE PROGRESSIVE, Mar. 1983, at 22, 26.
5. H.R. REP. No. 491, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3792, 3793.
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would be developed in the near future.6 In the mid 1970's, however,
reprocessing was determined to be economically unfeasible. Further-
more, the presence of plutonium, a by-product of reprocessing, caused
concern over the potential for proliferation of nuclear weapons. These
concerns caused Presidents Ford' and Carter to suspend further devel-
opment of advanced plutonium fuel based reactors and spent fuel
reprocessing plants.9
That suspension, however, caused much concern in the states in
which potential repository sites were located. The nuclear industry had
been suddenly confronted not only with a shift in its technological fu-
ture but also with an unanticipated liability in the form of spent fuels
stored at reactor sites. The absence of permanent storage sites height-
ened public concern because reactor sites were not designed for life-
time storage of nuclear waste.'0 The natural response of the states was
to try to prevent the disposal of nuclear waste within their borders."
However, the states were unable to achieve this goal because the
Atomic Energy Act of 195412 and its 1959 amendment 3 gave the states
little power to regulate in this area. This situation changed in 1983
with the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (Nuclear
6. Spent fuel rods removed from reactor cores can be reprocessed to remove unfissionable
isotopes of plutonium and uranium which can be reused as reactor fuel. REPORT OF THE NU-
CLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, NUCLEAR POWER Issues AND CHOICES 247-49 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR POWER].
7. It was determined not to be economical to fabricate light water reactor fuel using recov-
ered uranium. In addition, the cost of management and disposal of wastes from reprocessing
facilities had been underestimated. Two full-sized reprocessing plants and one pilot facility were
retired - one of the full-sized facilities before it ever operated - and another company's plans
for construction of a facility were canceled by 1976. H.R. REP. No. 491, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3792, 3793.
8. President Ford requested that the NRC halt proceedings for the licensing of mixed oxide
fuel recycle. Id at 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3793-94.
9. In 1977, the Carter administration adopted two policies in its effort to find a solution to
what it perceived as a world-wide problem of proliferation. First, the United States would indefi-
nitely defer commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium, as well as the commercial intro-
duction of the plutonium breeder. Second, President Carter proposed to reduce the funding for
the breeder program existing at the time and to redirect it toward evaluation of alternative breed-
ers, advanced converter reactors and other fuel cycles, with emphasis on nonproliferation and
safety concerns. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENERGY POLICY AND PLANNING, THE
NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN 70 (1977).
10. H.R. REP. No. 491, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3792, 3794.
11. See cases cited infra notes 66-68.
12. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976) (current version at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2296 (West Supp. 1984)).
13. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 1, 73 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. § 2021 (West Supp. 1984)).
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Waste Policy Act), 14 which granted states the power to participate in
the important decisions surrounding the construction of nuclear waste
repositories. 15
This Essay explores the ability of any affected states to participate
in the decision to dispose of nuclear waste under the Atomic Energy
Act and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 6 In addition, the controversy
over the validity of the Department of Energy's (DOE) research under-
lying its plan to build a nuclear waste repository at the Hanford site is
evaluated.' 7 The Essay concludes that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
was promulgated because of the Atomic Energy Act's failure to grant
the states a role in the decision to dispose of nuclear waste. It further
concludes that state participation is indispensible in evaluating the
DOE's important decisions leading up to the construction of a nuclear
waste repository.
II. NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNOLOGY
There are three types of radioactive waste associated with nuclear
electric power: low-level waste, spent fuel and high-level waste. Low-
level waste is material that is not originally radioactive but has become
so through exposure to radioactive products.' 8 This type of waste in-
cludes all of the equipment and clothing that have become radioac-
tive. 9 Because of its low radiation, low-level waste is not subject to the
special regulatory requirements that control high-level waste.
20
14. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,101-226 (1982).
15. See infra notes 102-112 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 66-123 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 124-147 and accompanying text.
18. 1977 Hearings, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Dr. Charles Hebel).
19. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR WASTE ISOLATION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANSWERS TO YOUR
QUESTIONS ABOUT HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE ISOLATION 3 (1982).
20. In 1980 Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-
573, §§ 2-4, 94 Stat. 3347 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021b-d (1982)) which granted each state the
responsibility for providing disposal capacity for low-level waste generated within its borders.
Section 2021d states:
(a)(1) It is the policy of the Federal Government that-
(A) each State is responsible for providing for the availability of capacity either
within or outside the State for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated
within its borders except for waste generated as a result of defense activities of the Secre-
tary or Federal research and development activities; and
(B) low-level radioactive waste can be most safely and efficiently managed on a
regional basis.
(2)(A) To carry out the policy set forth in paragraph (1), the States may enter into
such compacts as may be necessary to provide for the establishment and operation of
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Spent fuel is the discharged material from the core of a nuclear
plant. This material has not been defined as high-level waste by any
federal statute or regulation. However, because of its radioactivity, the
same safeguards that apply to high-level waste apply to spent fuel.2'
High-level waste consists of the by-products of nuclear reaction in
the fuel of both commercial and defense reactors.22 This type of waste
emits radioactivity that could be harmful both to humans and the envi-
ronment unless the waste is properly isolated. High-level waste under-
goes a decaying process and must be isolated from the environment
until the radioactivity decays to levels that will pose no significant
threat to humans or to the environment.23 Isolation for a period of
10,000 years is considered to be reasonably necessary in order to
achieve that objective.24
High-level waste is stored temporarily in surface tanks located at
the nuclear power plant and is the responsibility of each nuclear facil-
ity.25 When a permanent solution to the nuclear waste problem is de-
veloped, the responsibility for the storage of the waste will be
transferred to the federal government.26
There have been many proposals for the permanent disposal of
high-level waste. Transmutation of the waste into shorter-lived radio-
active materials,27 oceanic disposal,2  extraterrestrial disposal29 and
21. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 2, at ii.
22. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR WASTE ISOLATION, supra note 19, at 1.
23. Id at 3.
24. Id
25. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 10,151(a)(1) (1982). Subsection (a)(1)
states:
[T]he persons owning and operating civilian nuclear power reactors have the pri-
mary responsibility for providing interim storage of spent nuclear fuel from such reac-
tors, by maximizing, to the extent practical, the effective use of existing storage facilities
at the site of each civilian nuclear power reactor, and by adding new onsite storage ca-
pacity in a timely manner where practical ....
Id
26. Id § 10,131(a)(5).
27. 1977 Hearings, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Dr. Charles Hebel). This process trans-
forms radioactive elements into shorter-lived radioactive elements by bombarding them with neu-
trons. However, this process is technically quite difficult, and hazardous as well. Id
28. This process is not feasible as there is no known container which will withstand the corro-
sive effects of seawater for the necessary time period. Since the residence time of deep water is
only of the order of 100-1000 years, long lived wastes from broken containers would mix with the
upper, biologically active layers and thus enter the food chain. Emplacement of canisters in the
thick clay materials of the deep ocean is subject to many uncertainties about possible thermal
currents and sediment behavior as well as risks associated with extended sea transport and em-
placement in water of five kilometers depth. NUCLEAR POWER, supra note 6, at 255.
29. Extraterrestrial disposal would be prohibitively expensive and carries the risk of radioac-
[Vol. 20:31
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placement in water-cooled canals3" have been suggested. To date, the
most viable option is the disposal of nuclear waste in waste reposito-
ties." These repositories must be built in geologic formations which
have little or no water circulation but which do have natural bounda-
ries, which prevent the nuclear waste from entering the environment.32
These characteristics are found in the salt formations33 in the Louisiana
and Mississippi region and in the volcanic rock formations in the Ne-
vada and Washington area.34
III. LEGISLATION OF THE NUCLEAR ERA
A. Atomic Energy Act
The first legislation to address the issue of nuclear activity was the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946.3- This act established a scheme of total
federal control, including federal ownership of all fissionable material,
tive release on unsuccessful launch attempts. G. EICHHOLZ, ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF Nu-
CLEAR POWER 616 (1977).
30. Id at 590. Although water-cooled canals and air-cooled vaults would provide good in-
terim storage because of their heat-removal capabilities, they, too, are undesirable as long-term
disposal methods because of the constant surveillance required and the accident and sabotage
risks posed. Id
31. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR WASTE ISOLATION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, LEAFLET, WHAT A
NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORY LOOKS LIKE (1982). Conceptual designs of repositories have been
completed. From the surface, a nuclear waste repository would resemble a relatively large mine.
There would be railroad siding, facilities for deep excavation and buildings for unloading, han-
dling and repackaging nuclear waste prior to isolation. From the surface, several vertical shafts
would lead to tunnel-like storage zones about half a mile deep. Sealed in cannisters and further
protected by appropriately engineered barriers, the wastes would be placed in holes excavated
along the tunnels. As each storage zone is filled, the idles, tunnels and shafts would be backfilled
and sealed. Id
32. 1977 Hearings, supra note 3, at 5-7 (statement of Dr. Charles Hebel). In deep geological
burial, the waste containers are not exposed to corrosive elements of water or air. More impor-
tantly, however, the containers are supplemented by the geological barrier, which is by far more
enduring.
A committee of the National Academy of Sciences recommended burial of radioactive waste
in underground salt beds to be their medium of first choice, and certain other geologic media also
were deemed to be good potential sites. The American Physical Society study group concurred
with the National Academy and concluded that a waste repository can be developed in accord
with appropriate site selection criteria that would insure low probability that erosion, volcanism,
meteorite impact or other natural events could breach the repository. The Physical Society simi-
larly found that bedded salt can be a satisfactory medium for a repository, and concluded further
that certain other rock types, notably granite and possibly shale, could offer even greater long-
term advantages. Id
33. NUCLEAR POWER, supra note 6, at 256. The presence of salt at the site indicates the
absence of circulating groundwater, which is the principle mechanism of transporting waste to the
surface. Id
34. See infra note 137.
35. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1819 (1946) (current version at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2296 (West Supp. 1984)).
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and created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).3 6 Later, when
President Eisenhower decided it was time to transform nuclear power
into a source of energy for America, the Atomic Energy Act of 195431
was passed with the purpose of encouraging widespread private partici-
pation in the use and development of atomic energy. 31
As the nuclear industry began to develop in response to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, some states began to issue regulations.39
The AEC disapproved of this state action and took the position that
states were preempted from regulating the nuclear industry. Neverthe-
less, Congress recognized the need for state participation in the devel-
opment of nuclear energy and in 1959 amended the Atomic Energy Act
to clarify the respective state and federal roles in this field. 40
The 1959 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act was promulgated
for the purpose of organizing regulatory parameters for the nuclear in-
dustry while concurrently recognizing state and federal interests. To
accomplish this goal, the AEC was given the power to promote the
research and development of nuclear energy and to consider public
health and safety in the exercise of its regulatory responsibility. The
states, on the other hand, were given the power over the generation,
sale and transmission of electric power produced through the use of
nuclear facilities.41 Additionally, the amendment allowed the states to
assume certain licensing and regulatory responsibilities pursuant to a
turnover agreement42 between the state's governor and the AEC. How-
ever, there were many limitations placed on these agreements. For ex-
ample, state authority to regulate is limited to the duration of the
agreement.43 Once the agreement is terminated, state authority ceases
36. The AEC was abolished by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Its responsibilities
were given to the ERDA and the NRC. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
37. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976) (current version at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2296 (West Supp. 1984)).
38. In passing the 1954 Act, Congress opined that the goal of atomic power at competitive
prices would be reached more quickly if private enterprise, using private funds, was encouraged to
play a far larger role in the development of atomic power than was presently being permitted
under existing legislation. Congress "[did] not believe that any developmental program carried
out solely under governmental auspices, no matter how efficient it may be, [could] substitute for
the cost-cutting and other incentives of free and competitive enterprise." S. REP. No. 1699, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3456, 3459.
39. For a description of state regulatory activity during this period, see Frampton, Radiation
Exposure-The Needfor a National Policy, 10 STAN. L. REV. 7, 29-40 (1957).
40. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 1, 73 Stat. 688 (current version at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2021 (West Supp. 1984)).
41. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1982); see infra note 82.
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and federal authority resumes. State regulatory standards promulgated
pursuant to such an agreement have to be coordinated and compatible
with federal standards.' In other words, the courts have prohibited the
states from promulgating radiation protection standards that are more
stringent than those of the AEC.
The most extensive limitation on state regulatory power is section
202 1(c) of the 1954 Act which prevents states from entering into a turn-
over agreement with the AEC41 concerning the following subjects:
I. the construction and operation of any production or utilization
facility;
2. the export from or import into the United States of byproduct,
source, or special nuclear material, or of any production or utili-
zation facility;
3. the disposal into the ocean or sea of byproduct, source, or special
nuclear waste materials as defined in regulations or orders of the
Commission;
4. the disposal of such other byproduct, source, or special nuclear
material as the Commission determines by regulation or order
should because of the hazards or potential hazards thereof, not
be so disposed of without a license from the Commission.46
The Joint Commission on Atomic Energy explained that these ex-
cluded areas are of a complex and technical nature, are closely inter-
twined with the safety of the country, and can be best dealt with by
federal resources.47 Furthermore, these subjects are public policy mat-
44. Id § 2021(g) (1982). Subsection (d) provides that
[t]he Commission shall enter into an agreement ... with any State if... the Commis-
sion finds that the State program is. . . compatible with the Commission's program for
the regulation of [the hazardous materials covered by a proposed agreement], and that
the State program is adequate to protect the public health and safety with respect to
[such materials].
Id § 2021(d).
Although minor additional prerequisites to turnover do exist, such as subsection (e)'s require-
ment that the terms of a proposed agreement be published in the Federal Register, the important
requirements are compatibility and adequacy. In explaining the meaning of the compatibility
requirement, the committee report makes it clear that this means "identical," except for minor
variations such as terminology or periods for measuring maximum permissible exposures. The
committee had removed the language "to the extent feasible" so that there would be no danger of
"conflicting, overlapping, and inconsistent standards in different jurisdictions, to the hinderance of
industry and jeopardy of public safety." SEN. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in
1959 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws 2872, 2879; Estep & Adelman, State Control of Radiation
Hazards.- An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. REV. 41, 65 (1961).
As to the adequacy of the state program to protect the public health and safety, "Congress
seems to be concerned only that the AEC find that there is a large enough staff of well-qualified
state personnel to assure protection against health hazards." Id at 65-66.
45. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1982).
46. Id § 2021(c)(l)-(4).
47. The Joint Commission stated that in most cases, it intended state and local standards to
1984]
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ters which should be handled by the federal government. 48
B. Energy Reorganization Act
In 1974, the Energy Reorganization Act49 was promulgated due to
Congress' concern that the AEC could not perform the function of
promotor of the nuclear industry and at the same time protect public
health and safety. Accordingly, the Atomic Energy Commission was
abolished by the Act and its responsibilities were divided between the
Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA) and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC).5 ° The ERDA was given responsibility
for the research and development of various sources of energy. It was
specifically assigned the task of encouraging and conducting research
and development in the field of nuclear energy. The NRC, composed
of five members, was given responsibility for all the licensing and re-
lated regulatory matters previously performed by the AEC. To carry
out its responsibility, the NRC was given the authority to enter into
turnover agreements with states. 5'
C. Department of Energy Organization Act
The regulatory scenario was not completed until 1977 when the
Department of Energy Organization Act was passed.5 2 The 1977 Act
had two purposes. First, it was to reaffirm the goal expressed in the
1974 Energy Reorganization Act of a balanced energy source develop-
ment. Second, it was to declare an intent to place major emphasis on
development of the commercial use of solar and geothermal energy,
recycling, and other technologies.53 In order to carry out the purpose
of the 1977 Act, the ERDA was abolished and all of its functions were
given to the DOE.54 In addition, the DOE was given the responsibility
for nuclear waste management.5 5 The drafters of the Act thought that
by giving the DOE this responsibility a centralized waste management
be the same as federal standards to avoid conflict, duplication or gaps. S. REP. No. 870, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 11, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2872, 2882.
48. Id
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1982)).
50. Id §§ 5813, 5814(a), (b), 5841(f), 5842(3), (4).
51. Id § 5842(3), (4).
52. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101-7352 (West Supp. 1977) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352
(1982)).
53. Id § 7112(6).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7112-7113, 7131-7133 (1982).
55. Id § 7133(a)(8)(C).
[Vol. 20:31
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program would develop. 6 This development, however, did not occur
since responsibility for achieving safe handling and disposal of waste is
presently shared by the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency. 7
D. State Regulation of Nuclear Energy Activity for Purposes Other
Than Radiation Hazards
Of the few preemption cases in the nuclear field, Northern States
Power Co. v. Minnesota58 was the first case that dealt with a claim that
a state law purporting to regulate nuclear power plants was preempted
by the Atomic Energy Act. In Northern States, the Eighth Circuit, in a
controversial decision, overturned the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency's denial of a waste disposal permit needed in order to operate a
nuclear power plant, holding that the Atomic Energy Act implicitly
preempts state regulation of radiation hazards.59 Many critics of the
decision felt that the court went too far in limiting the state of Minne-
sota's power since states are given the authority to "regulate nuclear
activities for purposes other than the protection against radiation
hazards" under section 2021(k) of the Atomic Energy Act.60 The lan-
guage of this section requires a reviewing court to inquire into the pur-
pose of the state action to determine if it falls under the purview of
section 2021(k). The court in Northern States failed to make this
determination.
In Northern California Association to Preserve Bodega Head and
56. The Committee on Governmental Affairs, to which the bill establishing the DOE was
referred for passage, sought through passage of the Act to centralize and coordinate at a high level
in the DOE the following responsibilities: establishment of control over existing government fa-
cilities for the treatment and storage of nuclear wastes; establishment of control over all existing
nuclear waste in the possession or control of the government as well as all commercial nuclear
waste being stored at that time on sites other than licensed nuclear power electric generating
facilities; establishment of temporary and permanent storage facilities; and establishment of facili-
ties for the treatment of nuclear wastes. S. REP. No. 164, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 23,reprintedin 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 854, 877.
57. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 established the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), which has certain regulatory authority with respect to radioactive wastes. 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982)).
Under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-1970 comp.) reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. § 2(a)(6) (1982), the EPA is authorized to establish "[glenerally applicable environ-
mental standards for the protection of the general environment from radioactive material."
58. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afdmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
59. Id at 1154.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1982). "[Subsection k] is intended to make it clear that the bill does
not impair the State authority to regulate activities of AEC licensees for the manifold health,
safety, and economic purposes other than radiation protection." S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9, 12, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2872, 2882.
1984]
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Harbor v. Public Utilities Commission,61 the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia made the proper inquiry as required by section 2021(k). The court
allowed the State of California to restrict the building of a nuclear
power plant in an earthquake zone even though the state's concern was
that an earthquake would result in a radiation hazard. The court rea-
soned that California could restrict the construction of the plant pursu-
ant to section 2021(k) since safety considerations in addition to
radiation hazards were involved.62 In Marshall v. Consumers Power
Co. ,63 the Michigan Court of Appeals, in a case brought by a state
resident alleging that a nuclear power plant's cooling system consti-
tuted a nuisance by creating fogging and icing, held that these effects
were not radiation hazards and thus were proper subjects for state reg-
ulation.' However, the court held that it could not consider the effec-
tiveness of the plant's cooling system since it directly involved a
radiation hazard and states are implicitly preempted from regulating
this type of hazard under the holding of Northern States.65 These two
cases indicate that state regulation for purposes other than radiation
hazards is not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act even though they
have the effect of regulating radiation hazards.
E. State Regulation of Nuclear Waste Disposal Under the Atomic
Energy Act
Few cases have dealt with states' rights to regulate the disposal of
nuclear waste. Those cases that have dealt with the issue failed to re-
solve the important question of whether or not states can regulate nu-
clear waste disposal pursuant to section 2021(k) of the Atomic Energy
Act for purposes other than for the protection against radiation
hazards. For instance, in Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. ,66 the
61. 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964).
62. Id at 133, 390 P.2d at 206, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
63. 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975).
64. Id at -, 237 N.W.2d at 274-75.
65. Id at -, 237 N.W.2d at 274.
66. 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 469 (1982). The disposal site was located
near the city of West Chicago, which alleged that the disposal site's operation constituted a public
nuisance. The city sought injunctive relief. The district court rejected the city's argument that the
relief sought was not barred by federal preemption because the AEA did not extend to "municipal
regulations of non-radiological health, safety and welfare violations."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's rul-
ing. The court, relying on the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pacific Legal
Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981),
held that "[riegulation of non-radiation hazards by the states or their political subdivisions has not
... been preempted." Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 677 F.2d at 581. The court remanded the
[Vol. 20:31
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state of Illinois sought to prosecute a waste disposal operator for viola-
tion of the state public nuisance, pollution and refuse disposal laws. In
reversing the operator's previously granted motion to dismiss, the court
reaffirmed Northern States, holding that the NRC has exclusive author-
ity to regulate radiation hazards unless the state has an agreement
under which it is to assume some of the responsibility.67 In Washington
State Building & Construction Trades Council v. Spellman,68 the court
held that an initiative passed by voters of the state of Washington to
bar the importation of certain wastes into their state was unconstitu-
tional.69 The court stated that Congress realized that transportation
and storage of nuclear materials were radiation hazards which should
be regulated by the federal government except in instances where juris-
diction had been expressly ceded to the states.7° The court further held
that the ban was an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 7'
These cases confirm the restriction of state power to regulate nuclear
waste disposal when the decision to regulate is based on protection
against radiation hazards. They do not, however, clarify the legality of
states' power to regulate nuclear waste disposal for purposes other than
radiation hazards.
In April, 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States shed some
light on this issue when it rendered a decision which acknowledged the
problems of nuclear waste disposal. In Pacfc Gas & Electric Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission,72 the
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of whether provisions in the 1976
amendments to certain sections of California's Warren-Alquist Act
which condition the construction of nuclear plants on findings by a
California state commission that adequate storage facilities and means
of disposal are available for nuclear waste, are preempted by the
Atomic Energy Act. The Court held that the California statute was not
preempted by the Atomic Energy Act because the statute was not
designed to provide protection against radiation hazards. Rather, it
case to the district court for a determination of whether the city sought to regulate radiation or
non-radiation hazards. Id at 584.
67. Id at 581.
68. 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aI'd, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
69. Id at 935.
70. Id at 931.
71. Id at 933.
72. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
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was adopted because the uncertainties in the fuel cycle73 make nuclear
power an uneconomical and uncertain source of energy.74 Further-
more, the Court agreed with the assessment of the committee which
had introduced the statute that the lack of a federally approved method
of waste disposal created a clog in the fuel cycle since nuclear wastes
are continually produced without a permanent means of disposal. 7"
This clog can become critical, leading to unpredictably high costs to
contain the problem, or worse, to reactor shutdown.76 Finally, the
Court stated that the promotion of nuclear power is not to be accom-
plished at all costs. 77 The states can choose which source of power to
use when generating electricity.78 Therefore, the states can reject nu-
clear energy and prevent the construction of a nuclear power plant if
the decision is based on economic considerations.79
The Pacffc Gas & Electric case was an important decision since it
was the first case to recognize the problems associated with nuclear
waste disposal. The Supreme Court considered waste disposal to be
such a grave problem that it held permissible state action that pre-
vented the construction of a nuclear power plant until the state deter-
mined that there was an appropriate method of disposal.
Another innovation of the Supreme Court ruling is that states can
prevent the construction of a nuclear power plant pursuant to section
2021(k)8° if the decision is based on economic considerations. In other
words, economic considerations fall within the meaning of section
2021(k) which allows states to regulate for purposes other than for pro-
tection against radiation hazards. Prior to this case, the only interpreta-
tion of this section was that states could regulate nuclear activities
pursuant to their zoning law powers.8'
The Supreme Court in Pacjic Gas & Electric did not address the
issue of whether states could regulate nuclear waste disposal activities
73. The fuel cycle for nuclear plants begins with the mining process and ends when the nu-
clear waste is safely disposed.
74. Pac /c Gas & Elec., 103 S. Ct. at 1720, 1728.
75. Id at 1727.
76. 1d
77. Id at 1731.
78. The Court states: "Congress has allowed the States to determine. . . whether a nuclear
plant vis-a-vis a fossil fuel plant should be built." Id
79. Id at 1732.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1982) states: "Nothing in this section shall be contrued to affect the
authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards."
81. Northern Cal. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 61
Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964).
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for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards pursuant
to section 2021(k). Nevertheless, it could be logically inferred that
states have this power since no provision in the Atomic Energy Act
expressly prevents the states from regulating waste disposal activities.
However, states' power to regulate nuclear activities, after the passage
of the 1959 amendment, is limited to those powers expressly ceded to
the states in the Atomic Energy Act or to those specified in a turnover
agreement entered into between a state and the NRC.
The provisions in the Act that grant the states power to regulate
nuclear activities are sections 201882 and 2021.11 Section 2018 grants
states authority over the sale, generation or transportation of electric
power generated from nuclear power plants. It does not grant states
the authority to regulate the disposal of nuclear waste. Section
2021(k)84 states: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect
the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for pur-
poses other than protection against radiation hazards." This section
does not provide for state regulation of nuclear waste disposal for pur-
poses other than protection against radiation hazards because section
2021(k) is not an affirmative grant of power to the statesY Rather, the
section was promulgated to underscore the distinction drawn in the
1954 Act between the spheres of activity left respectively to the federal
government and the states.8 6
Finally, section 2021(b) authorizes the NRC to enter into a turno-
ver agreement with the states allowing the states to regulate specific
nuclear activities under limited conditions.87 The subject matter of
these agreements is limited by section 2021(c). One such limitation is
that the Commission shall retain authority over and responsibility for
the disposal of such by-products, source, or special nuclear materials as
the Commission determines. 8 Since NRC regulations specify that it
82. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1982) states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of
any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of
electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission:
Prorided, That this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or




84. Id § 2021(k).
85. Pacpk Gas & Elec., 103 S. Ct. at 1725.
86. Id
87. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1982).
88. Id § 2021(c)(4).
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retains regulatory authority over the transfer, storage and disposal of
high-level waste,89 states are preempted from regulating these wastes
pursuant to a turnover agreement. Because sections 2018 and 2021(k)
do not grant the states the power to regulate nuclear waste disposal and
the states are prevented from entering into a turnover agreement with
the NRC concerning this matter, the states are preempted under the
Atomic Energy Act from regulating nuclear waste disposal.
In conclusion, the Atomic Energy Act does not grant a state the
authority to regulate nuclear waste disposal activities. If a state at-
tempts to regulate this type of activity it would be preempted under the
Supremacy Clause. Nevertheless, Congress recognized that nuclear
waste disposal was becoming the focal point of the nuclear debate and
that there was an imminent need for cooperation between the federal
government and state governments to solve this problem. Subse-
quently, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act9" was passed by Congress in
December, 1982, and was signed into law by the President in January,
1983, to deal with such issues.
IV. NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT
A. Background
In the final days of the 97th Congress, the House and the Senate
passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act with the intention of developing a
cooperative effort by the federal and state governments to overcome the
problem of nuclear waste disposal. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act af-
firmed the federal role in the research and development of nuclear
waste disposal 9' and provided for state and public participation in the
decision process concerning disposal of the waste. 92 More importantly,
the Act granted states the power to veto the decision of the federal gov-
ernment to construct a nuclear waste repository within the states' bor-
ders.93 This veto, however, could be overridden by a joint resolution of
89. Continued Commission Regulatory Authority in Agreement States, 10 C.F.R.§ 150.15(a)(4) (1978).
90. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,101-226 (1982).
91. Id § 10,131(a)(4), 10,131(b)(2).
92. Id § 10,131(a)(6), 10,131(b)(3).
In addition to providing for state participation, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act provides for
participation of "affected Indian tribes." Id § 10,138. For a definition of an "affected Indian
tribe," see id § 10,101(2).
This Essay will only discuss states' abilities to participate in nuclear waste disposal. It should
be noted, however, that "affected Indian tribes" have authority similar to that given to states.
93. Id § 10,136(b) provides:
[Vol. 20:31
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss1/2
19841 NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL
Congress. 94
The Act is divided into three titles that deal, respectively, with dis-
posal,95 research and development, 96 and the financing of a nuclear
waste repository. 97 The remainder of this Essay will focus on the pro-
cess of choosing a site suitable for the development of a repository, the
state role in this decision process and the DOE's present attempt to
build a repository at the Hanford, Washington site.
B. Site Selection Process
The selection of a site suitable for the construction of a nuclear
waste repository is a multistepped process which is outlined in chrono-
logical order in Appendix A. This process can be separated into two
basic stages. The first stage involves the selection of a site which is
suitable for site characterization activities.98 Site characterization is the
drilling and testing of the geologic medium to determine if the site has
the necessary qualities to house a repository.99 The second stage in-
volves the analysis of the site characterization results and the selection
of a site suitable for the construction of a repository.100 It is during this
latter stage of the decision process that a state has the power to veto the
decisions of the Secretary of the Department of Energy and the Presi-
(1) Unless otherwise provided by state law, the Governor or legislature of each
State shall have authority to submit a notice of disapproval to the Congress under para-
graph (2).
(2) Upon the submission by the President to the Congress of a recommenda-
tion of a site for a repository, the Governor or legislature of the State in which such site is
located may disapprove the site designation and submit to the Congress a notice of dis-
approval. . . . Such notice of disapproval shall be accompanied by a statement of rea-
sons explaining why such Governor or legislature disapproved the recommended
repository site involved.
Id
94. Id § 10,135(a).
95. Id §§ 10,121-171.
96. Id §§ 10,191-203.
97. Id §§ 10,221-226.
98. Id § 10,132.
99. Id § 10,101(21).
The term "site characterization" means-
(A) siting research activities with respect to a test and evaluation facility at a can-
didate site; and
(B) activities, whether in the laboratory or in the field, undertaken to establish the
geologic condition and the ranges of the parameters of a candidate site relevant to the
location of a repository, including borings, surface excavations, excavations of explora-
tory shafts, limited subsurface lateral excavations and borings, and in situ testing needed
to evaluate the suitability of a candidate site for the location of a repository, but not
including preliminary borings and geophysical testing needed to assess whether site char-
acterization should be undertaken.
Id
100. Id §§ 10,133-141.
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dent to build a repository.' 0 ' As previously stated, the state veto can be
overridden by a joint resolution of Congress. 0
C. State Particpation Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
The original purpose of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was to grant
affected states a limited right to participate in the decision to construct
and operate a nuclear waste repository. Consequently, the drafters of
the Act were against granting states a veto right since this would give
them more power than originally intended, but due to political pres-
sure, the veto provision was included. 10 3 In addition to the power that
is expressly derived from a veto, the states received the implicit power
of the threat of a veto. This implicit power will benefit the states' bar-
gaining position more than the veto itself. This benefit arises because a
state veto triggers additional procedural steps which will result in a de-
lay in the completion of a repository."° A lengthy delay can be critical
to timely completion since it allows those who are opposed to construc-
tion of a repository the time to organize, resulting in additional legal
problems. Therefore, to avoid these delays, the Secretary will have to
work closely with the states in order to alleviate their concerns.
Before a final decision to construct a waste repository is made,
states have many opportunities to participate with the DOE in the deci-
sion process. The first opportunity occurs before the Secretary recom-
mends to the President those sites that he has determined to be suitable
for site characterization activities. The Secretary notifies the governor
101. See supra note 93.
102. See supra note 94.
103. Carter, The Radwaste Paradox, 219 SCIENCE 33, 34 (Jan. 7, 1983).
The main barrier to final passage was lifted when Senator James McClure (R-
Idaho), chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, yielded to the threat
of a filibuster on an issue deemed of critical importance by potential repository host
states. Their position was that, if a repository site selected for licensing application by
the Department of Energy (DOE) and the President should be unacceptable to the host
state, its "veto" of the site should stand unless overridden by both houses of Congress,
Although there was substantial congressional support for this position, the bills first
passed by the House and Senate had not gone that far, each body having chosen instead
to give the host states a veto that would stand only if sustained by at least one house of
Congress. But Senator William Proxmire, whose home state of Wisconsin contains gran-
ite formations that are of interest to DOE, was able to take advantage of the lateness of
the hour by threatening to filibuster unless the state position was accepted.
McClure, as Senate manager of the legislation, chose to give in to Proxmire rather
than see the legislation die, just as a previous radwaste bill had died in 1980 at the close
of the 96th Congress. This broke the impasse, with the Senate agreeing by voice vote to
the bill with the more liberal state veto provision. Final passage in the House was by a
vote of 256 to 32.
Id
104. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,134(a)(3), 10,135(a)-(g) (1982).
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and legislature of the state in which a site is to be located of his decision
to recommend such site and the basis for such recommendation. 05 In
addition, the Secretary is required to hold a public hearing in the vicin-
ity of the nominated sites to inform the residents of the proposed site
activities of the recommendation and to receive their comments. 10
6
Once this is completed, the Secretary sends his recommendation of the
sites to the President, accompanied by an environmental assessment
that incorporates the comments received at the public hearing. 07
The second opportunity the states have to participate occurs no
later than 60 days after the President approves a site for characteriza-
tion activities.10 8 At that point, the Secretary seeks to enter into a writ-
ten agreement with the affected state setting forth the procedures under
which consultation and cooperation between the parties will be carried
out. 0 9 The written agreement shall specify the procedure that will be
used for resolving objections of an affected state at any stage of the
planning, siting, development, construction, operation or closure of
such facility through negotiation, arbitration or other appropriate
mechanisms.
The third opportunity the states have to participate occurs before
site characterization begins when the Secretary is required to submit to
affected states a general plan containing a description of the site char-
acterization activities, the possible form of packaging of high-level
waste and spent fuel and the conceptual repository design. 0 After re-
ceiving the general plan, the governor of the state can comment to the
Secretary regarding his concerns of the impact of the activities on pub-
lic health and safety and on the environment."'
Finally, at any time during characterization activity the governor
of an affected state can request that the Secretary provide him with
timely and complete information regarding determinations or plans
made with respect to the activities of a site." 2 If the Secretary fails to
respond to the request he is required to immediately suspend all activi-
ties at the site." 3
105. Id § 10,132(b)(1)(H).
106. Id § 10,132(b)(2).
107. Id § 10,132(b)(1)(E), 10,132(b)(2).
108. Id § 10,137(c).
109. Id
110. Id § 10,133(b)(1)(A)-(C).
111. Id § 10,133(b)(1)(A).
112. Id § 10,137(a).
113. Id § 10,137(a)(2).
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D. Implicit Power of the State Veto
The Secretary of Energy is required to evaluate the comments sub-
mitted by the governor of an affected state and to act upon them to the
maximum extent feasible.I14 The Secretary also decides the parameters
of the "maximum extent feasible," thus determining the extent of the
state's ability to participate in the decision to build a repository. The
Secretary, therefore, can either ignore the concerns of the state upon his
determination that correcting the problem is infeasible, or listen to the
concerns of the state, making its opportunity for participation
meaningful.
Unfortunately, the Secretary is required to meet the strict time
schedule of the Waste Act." 5 If he addresses all of a state's concerns,
compliance would be impossible. Additionally, the Secretary is under
pressure from powerful interest groups and political sources to build a
repository expediently. A statement by President Reagan illustrates
this point:
I am instructing the Secretary of Energy, working closely with indus-
try and state governments, to proceed swiftly toward development of
the means of storing and disposing of commercial high-level waste.
We must take steps now to accomplish this objective and demon-
strate to the public that problems associated with management of nu-
clear waste can be resolved. 16
It is pressure such as this that will cause the Secretary to favor ignoring
a state's complaints concerning environmental and consumer protec-
tion. However, a state has the power to force the Secretary to consider
its complaints by threatening to veto the Secretary's decision to build a
repository. The Secretary will be forced to choose between the delays
that arise from considering a state's complaints and the delays associ-
ated with the procedure necessary to override a state veto." 17 Because
the latter will probably be more time consuming, the threat of a veto
will force the Secretary to carefully consider the concerns of the state.
If an affected state is still not satisfied with the Secretary's review
of its complaints, the governor can exercise his veto option"18 within 60
days after the date the President recommends to Congress the suitabil-
114. Id § 10,137(b).
115. See APPENDIX A.
116. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR WASTE ISOLATION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY BRIEFING ON FIELD TESTING A-3 (1982).
117. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
118. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 10,136(b)(1) (1982).
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ity of a site for the location of a nuclear waste repository.'1 9 The veto
takes the form of a notice of disapproval and must be accompanied by
a statement of the reasons why the state disapproves the recommenda-
tion of the repository site involved. 2 ° This veto gives the state only
limited power since it may be overridden by a joint resolution of
Congress. 121
If Congress overrides the veto, the state has a last chance to attack
the plans for a repository during the NRC's licensing process.'
21
Chances are that at this stage, after all the studies have been completed
and approved, the NRC will grant a license for the construction of a
repository. However, the NRC is an agency of experts and might scru-
tinize the DOE's plans more thoroughly than Congress did when it
considered overriding the state veto.
E. State Power After the Approval of a Site
Construction of a nuclear waste repository can begin only after the
following events occur. First, the affected state refrains from exercising
its veto option or it exercises its option but is overridden by a joint
resolution of Congress. Second, the NRC grants a construction and
operation license.123 Once construction of the repository begins, a
state's power is limited to one of minor supervision. For instance, a
state still has the power to receive timely and complete information
regarding the construction and operation of the repository.'2 4 How-
ever, without the threat of a veto the Secretary has no incentive to listen
to a state's complaints. Nevertheless, the written agreement between
the state and the Secretary is still binding and could provide some
power to a state to prevent the Secretary from drastically deviating
from the proposed plans.
V. AN EXAMPLE: THE HANFORD SITE
Investigations have been underway at four different types of geo-
logical formations in six states: the old basalt lava flows of the Colum-
bia Plateau at DOE's Hanford facility in Washington, the welded tuff
119. Id § 10,136(b)(2).
120. Id
121. Id § 10,135(c).
122. Disposal of High Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic Repositories, 10 C.F.R. §§ 60.61-
.65 (1983).
123. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 10,134(d) (1982).
124. Id § I0,137(a)(2).
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(another type of volcanic rock) at the Nevada site, 2 bedded salt in the
Paradox Basin of southeastern Utah and the Palo Duro Basin in the
west Texas panhandle, and the salt domes in the Louisiana and Missis-
sippi region.'26 The Basalt Waste Isolation Project at the Hanford site
is presently the primary concern of the DOE since the site has been a
government testing ground for nuclear energy for many years.
A. Facts About the Hanford Site
The Hanford site is located in the south central portion of the state
of Washington and is grounded on thick basaltic formations covering
570 square miles of the Pasco Basin within the Columbia plateau. Ba-
salt is a dark, dense, fine grained volcanic rock that flowed in sheet-like
lava flows between 12 and 16 million years ago. 2 7 Much is known
about this area since it is an existing government-owned site dedicated
to nuclear activities since 1943.
B. Procedural Errors by the Department of Energy
Before the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the NRC an-
nounced rules that were to be followed when disposing of nuclear
waste. 128 Pursuant to these rules the DOE set up general guidelines
that were to be followed in selecting a site suitable for the construction
of a nuclear waste repository. In accordance with these guidelines the
DOE performed geological studies at the Hanford site and submitted
its findings in the form of an environmental assessment to the NRC.
Once the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was passed, all activity at the Han-
ford site was stopped until the procedures of the new act were followed.
The DOE promptly submitted its guidelines promulgated under the
NRC rules to satisfy requirements under the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act. 129 The submitted guidelines, however, were grossly inadequate
since they failed to specify factors which qualify or disqualify a site
from development as a repository as required by section 112(a) of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act.'13 Therefore, the Secretary of Energy was
125. Carter, supra note 103 at 35.
126. Id
127. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECT FACTS 1.
128. Disposal of High Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic Repositories, 10 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-
.73 (1983).
129. Proposed Guidelines for Recommendations of Sites for Nuclear Waste Repositories, 10
C.F.R. § 960 (1983).
130. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INST., COMMENTS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTITUTE
IN THE MATTER OF: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SOLICITATION OF COMMENTS CONCERNING THE
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required to rewrite the guidelines, but as of January 1, 1984 had not yet
done so.131
The Secretary also violated the procedures of the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act when he submitted an environmental assessment completed
in accordance with the NRC rules to satisfy the requirement of section
112(b) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The submitted environmental
assessment was virtually identical to a National Environmental Policy
Act' 32 (NEPA) environmental assessment 33 which is in no way similar
to that required under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.' 34 In fact, the
environmental assessment required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is
PROPOSAL TO NOMINATE THE BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECT SITE AT HANFORD, WASHING-
TON UNDER THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1982 § 1.1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as EPI
COMMENTS]. The EPI commented:
The proposed guidelines do not constitute an adequate basis for determining suitability
for site characterization. Similarly, DOE has failed to define, in the proposed guidelines,
which factors require characterization and which do not. The proposed guidelines also
fail to adequately describe "qualifying" and "disqualifying" factors which may, or may
not, require site characterization.
Id
131. On January 11, 1983, the Commission started proceedings to determine if the new DOE
guidelines satisfied the requirements of § 112(a) of the Waste Act.
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982).
133. An environmental assessment is prepared when an agency is uncertain whether to pre-
pare an environmental impact statement (EIS) as required by § 102(c) of the NEPA. Each agency
is free to develop its own standards and procedures for the assessment process. The assessment
can serve as an early decision document that identifies environmental impacts, examines alterna-
tives, and specifies ways to mitigate adverse environmental effects. The assessment process results
in either a decision to prepare a formal EIS or a negative declaration, a decision that no EIS is
required. T.J. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 114 (1982).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 10,132(b)(1)(E) (1982).
Each nomination of a site under this subsection shall be accompanied by an envi-
ronmental assessment, which shall include a detailed statement of the basis for such
recommendation and of the probable impacts of the site characterization activities
planned for such site, and a discussion of alternative activities relating to site characteri-
zation that may be undertaken to avoid such impacts. Such environmental assessment
shall include-
(i) an evaluation by the Secretary as to whether such site is suitable for site
characterization under the guidelines established under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion;
(ii) an evaluation by the Secretary as to whether such site is suitable for devel-
opment as a repository under each such guideline that does not require site charac-
terization as a prerequisite for application of such guideline;
(iii) an evaluation by the Secretary of the effects of the site characterization
activities at such site on the public health and safety and the environment;
(iv) a reasonable comparative evaluation by the Secretary of such site with
other sites and locations that have been considered;
(v) a description of the decision process by which such site was recommended;
and
(vi) an assessment of the regional and local impacts of locating the proposed
repository at such site.
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more like an environmental impact statement required by NEPA. t35
Unlike an environmental assessment required by NEPA, an environ-
mental assessment required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is a final
agency action subject to full judicial review.36
Finally, the DOE's decision to nominate the Hanford site for char-
acterization activities was not in accordance with the procedure set out
in section 112(a) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. This section re-
quires that site selection guidelines give primary consideration to geo-
logical factors. However, the DOE's environmental assessment of the
Hanford site states that the site was selected because it is a federally
owned tract of land in Washington that is presently committed to nu-
clear activites and may contain host rocks at appropriate depths for a
repository.'37 In their proposed environmental assessment, the DOE
failed to explain why the selection of a site on federally owned land is
135. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
[A]II agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id
136. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 10,132(b)(1)(F)(i) (1982).
137. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR CHARACTERIZATION
OF THE HANFORD SITE PURSUANT TO THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1982 (PUBLIC LAW
97-425) §§ 2.2, 2.3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT ASSESSMENT]. The DOE's National Waste
Terminal Storage (NWTS) Program follows a formal three-step siting process that begins with
national screening and culminates in detailed site characterization of candidate sites for a nuclear
waste repository. The first phase of the siting process is site screening, designed to find sites
favorable for waste isolation. The DOE cites three approaches that it uses to identify starting
points for screening studies. The first is the "host rock approach," by which the DOE identifies
regions containing potentially suitable host rock types. A second approach is the DOE's initiation
of siting studies at federally owned land tracts in Nevada and Washington (known as the Nevada
Test Site and the Hanford Site), which have been committed to nuclear activities and which may
contain suitable host rocks at appropriate depths for a repository. The third approach, called
province screening, is based on the scrutiny of successively smaller subdivisions of broad prov-
inces where geohydrologic conditions include multiple natural barriers to radionuclide migration,
The DOE stated that although province screening and other approaches may identify addi-
tional candidate sites, the locations currently under study (including the Hanford site) were identi-
fied using the host rock and land use approaches. Specifically mentioned was the fact that "[in
the DOE-NWTS Program national site screening plan, early consideration was given to the Han-
ford Site in Washington State because of its prior long-standing use and commitment to nuclear
activities and existing Government ownership." Id
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consistent with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act or would lead to the se-
lection of the best possible site for the location of a repository.
The Hanford site should not be considered a suitable site for char-
acterization activities until the Secretary adheres to the procedures re-
quired by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
C. Geological Findings by the Department of Energy
The environmental assessment required by the Nuclear Waste Pol-
icy Act is a comprehensive report specifically detailing the findings of
the DOE at an examined site. As stated previously, the environmental
assessment submitted by the DOE was not as extensive as that required
by the Waste Act. In addition, the validity of the conclusions cited in
the environmental assessment is questionable. For example, the DOE's
environmental assessment states that estimated groundwater travel
time "'38 at the Hanford site is in excess of 13,000 years and, therefore, is
in compliance with the NRC's proposed 1000 year minimum.'3 9 How-
ever, the NRC found this conclusion to be unfounded because the
groundwater travel time varied considerably based on available
data. 140 For that reason, the staff concluded that the DOE's ground-
water travel time calculations cannot be given a significant degree of
confidence. 141
Another area in dispute is the DOE's conclusion pertaining to seis-
mic activity of the Hanford site. The DOE concluded that the Hanford
site is located in an area of historically low seismic activity and that the
largest seismic event to occur in the area was the 1936 Milton Free-
water earthquake that was caused by the Milton Freewater Struc-
ture.142 The NRC disagrees with this finding and concludes that the
138. Groundwater travel time is the time needed for groundwater to travel from the repository
site to the accessible environment.
139. DRAFT ASSESSMENT, supra note 137, at § 2.4.2 (1983).
140. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA-
TORY CONM'N, DRAFT SITE CHARACTERIZATION ANALYSIS OF THE SITE CHARACTERIZATION
REPORT FOR THE BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECT § 3.3.2 (1983) [hereinafter cited as NRC
DRAFT ANALYSIS]. The NRC stated:
Sensitivity studies by the NRC staff show that calculations of pre-emplacement ground-
water travel time can vary by several order of magnitude (from 20 years to greater than 1
million years), based on currently available hydrologic data. . . . The large range of
possible travel times is the result of uncertainties in the hydrogeologic characterization of
the Hanford site [including uncertainties] about the conceptual model, key hydraulic
arameters, the nature of hydrogeologic boundaries, the validity of DOE's use of
ydrochemistry, and the results of DOE's preliminary numerical modeling. . ..
Id
141. Id
142. DRAFT ASSESSMENT, supra note 137, at § 2.5.3.
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Rattlesnake Wallula Formation near the Hanford site was the structure
responsible for the event.' 43 Moreover, the ERDA (the predecessor to
the DOE) stated that the Hanford site is situated in a "seismic zone 2"
as designated by the U.S. Coast and Geodetric Survey, implying the
potential for modest damage from earthquakes.'" Since seismic activ-
ity could be extremely dangerous to a nuclear waste repository and
since agencies such as the NRC, ERDA and the DOE cannot agree on
the cause of a seismic event which has occurred in the past 47 years, it
would seem practical to stop considering the Hanford site to be suitable
for a nuclear waste repository until these discrepancies can be cleared
up.
Finally, the DOE's finding that the operation of the Hanford re-
pository will not affect other nuclear activities carried out near the
Hanford site is not justified. For instance, adjacent to the Hanford site
are chemical reprocessing facilities containing large and concentrated
quantities of nuclear material, including potentially dangerous quanti-
ties of plutonium. The site is also adjacent to a nuclear reactor facility,
a fast flux testing facility and two Washington public power supply sys-
tem commercial nuclear power plants (now under construction).14 Al-
though the probability of a major accident at these facilities may be
small, the consequences of a severe release of radioactive elements
could greatly affect the repository activities which are expected to ex-
tend over 80 years. 146 Nevertheless, the DOE concluded that the repos-
itory will not adversely affect the other nuclear activities carried out at
the Hanford site. It did not, however, mention the effects the other
nuclear activities might have on the construction or operation of the
repository. 47 Furthermore, the environmental assessment is silent
about the fact that 450,000 gallons of high-level radioactive waste
leaked from tanks in the area adjacent to the proposed repository
site.' 48 These waste leaks have contaminated both the unsaturated and
saturated zones in the central part of the Hanford region and could be
released into the environment if the repository were built. t49 As a re-
sult, the Hanford site should not be considered a suitable site for char-
143. NRC DRAFT ANALYSIS, supra note 140, at § 4.3.3.
144. ERDA, ALTERNATIVES FOR LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE HIoH-LEVEL RA-
DIOACTIVE WASTE: HANFORD RESERVATION § 3.1 (1977).
145. EPI COMMENTS, supra note 130, at 23.
146. Id
147. DRAFT ASSESSMENT, supra note 137, at § 3.1.3.5.5.4.
148. EPI COMMENTS, supra note 130, at 24.
149. Id at 25.
[Vol. 20:31
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acterization activities until the DOE upgrades its research for the
purposes of resolving the above discrepancies.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act gives the Department of Energy
responsibility for the development and construction of nuclear waste
repositories. The drafters of the Act believed that by incorporating
time requirements within the Act, the DOE would perform responsibly
and quickly in resolving the waste problem. Unfortunately, this has
not occurred. The first requirement of Nuclear Waste Policy Act was
that the Secretary of Energy issue guidelines by July 7, 1983. As of
January 1, 1984 the Secretary had failed to issue adequate guidelines,
leading to a six-month delay in the process to build the first repository.
The DOE's failure to consider safety as the primary factor when storing
nuclear waste will lead to state intervention and, as a result, to addi-
tional delays.
W. Kenneth Davis's (Deputy Secretary of the DOE) statement
concerning the disposal of nuclear waste demonstrates this policy of
slighting the safety factor:
We do not need a perfect solution, only an adequate one .... [W]e
must stop studying and begin now to build a test and evaluation fa-
cility, leading to a licensed repository .... [L]et us move swiftly to
demonstrate that America's technical and scientific genius can dis-
pose of high-level waste in several geologies.' 50
The attitude reflected in this statement is evidence that those with the
ultimate responsibility to store nuclear waste have been basing their
decisions on factors which enhance the image of our country, rather
than factors which enhance the safety of its people and environment.
The existence of this attitude, coupled with the DOE's inadequate re-
search, emphasizes the importance of the state role under the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act in evaluating and participating in the decision to con-
struct a nuclear waste repository.
Robert A. Klausner
150. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR WASTE ISOLATION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY BRIEFING ON FIELD TESTING A-3 (1982).
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APPENDIX A
A SCHEDULE FOR FEDERAL AND STATE DECISIONS AND
ACTIONS PURSUANT TO REPOSITORY
DEVELOPMENT
Chronology
No later than 180 days after
the date of enactment of this
Act (January 7, 1983).
No later than 180 days after
the date of enactment of this
Act (January 7, 1983).
Before nominating a site to
the President that the
Secretary determines suitable
for site characterization for
the selection of the first
repository site.
At any time after the
Secretary's notification.
No later than January 1,
1985.









proposed to be studied in
depth for possible licensing as
repositories.
Secretary shall notify the
Governor, the State
legislature, and the tribal
council of any affected Indian
tribe in any state of the
potentially acceptable sites
within such state.
Secretary shall notify the
Governor, the State
legislature, and the governing
body of any affected Indian
tribe of such nomination and
the basis for such nomination.
The Secretary shall also hold
a public hearing in the
vicinity of such site.
117(a)(2) Upon written request for
information by the Governor
or legislature of any affected
state or by an affected Indian
tribe regarding determinations
or plans made with respect to
the chosen repository site, the
Secretary will provide a
written response within 30
days.
12(b)(1)(B) Secretary shall recommend to
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No later than 60 days after
the Secretary's candidate site
recommendations.
No later than 60 days after
the approval of a site for site







recommends to the President
a site which has been
determined suitable for a
repository.
No sooner than 30 days after
notification to the state or
Indian tribe.
112(c)(1) President approves or
disapproves sites for study
and notifies the affected states
and Indian tribes of his
decision.
117(c) Secretary shall seek to enter
into a binding written
agreement with the affected
state and affected Indian tribe.
13(b)(1) Secretary shall submit for
such candidate site to the
Commission, the Governor of
the state or the affected
Indian tribe a general plan for
site characterization activities.
113(b)(3) Secretary shall report not less
than once every 6 months to
the Commission, the
Governor of the affected state
and the affected Indian tribe
on the nature and extent of
such activities.
114(a)(1) Secretary shall hold public
hearings in the vicinity of
each site. The Secretary shall
also notify the Governor of
the affected state and the
affected Indian tribe of his
decision to recommend the
site to the President.
114(a)(1)
No later than March 31, 1987. 114(a)(2)(A)
Secretary shall submit to the
President a recommendation
that the President approve
such site for the development
of a repository.
President shall submit to the
Congress a recommendation
of one site qualified for
application for a construction
authorization for a repository.
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If Congress approves the site.
If a state or Indian tribe
submits to Congress a petition
for disapproval.
If Congress does not override
a state or Indian tribe notice
of disapproval.
When a site designation has
become effective (i.e., has not
been disapproved).
No later than January 1,
1989, or the expiration of 3
















No later than March 31, 1990. 114(a)(2)(A)
No later than January 1,
1992.
The designation of a site
suitable for application for a
construction authorization for
a repository is effective if a
notice of disapproval is not
submitted to Congress by an
affected state or Indian tribe
or if Congress acts to override
a State or tribal disapproval.
Congress has 90 calendar days
of continuous session of
Congress to override a notice
of disapproval. State and
affected Indian tribe have 60
days after the date the
President recommends such
site to submit a notice of
disapproval.
President shall submit to
Congress a recommendation
for another site within one
year.
Within 90 days the Secretary
shall submit to the NRC an
application for a construction
authorization for a repository
at such site.
NRC shall approve or
disapprove a repository site
construction authorization.
Secretary shall nominate 5
additional sites.
President shall submit to
Congress a second site which
he determines is qualified for
a construction authorization
for a second repository.
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Around 1995. Operation of the first national
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